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MENTAL HEALTH—SEX OFFENDERS:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CONTEMPLATES
THE USE OF SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
WHILE DENYING A PETITION FOR DISCHARGE
In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719

ABSTRACT
In In re G.R.H., the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s order rejecting G.R.H.’s petition for discharge from commitment as
a sexually dangerous individual. G.R.H.’s previous criminal history, his
confessions during treatment, his diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder and sexual attraction to adolescents, and his lack of self-control
satisfied the definition of a sexually dangerous individual. G.R.H. disclosed he had contact with previously unknown adolescent victims during a
homework exercise and polygraph at a treatment center. In her concurrence, Justice Kapsner labeled these disclosures as self-incriminating statements. Distinguishing In re G.R.H. from Allen v. Illinois, Justice Kapsner
explained that North Dakota’s sexually dangerous individual commitment
jurisprudence allows a trial court to consider both refusal to disclose and
disclosure of additional sexually predatory conduct as evidence of the need
to continue commitment. Additionally, North Dakota law currently prohibits the use of final determinations of civil commitments as evidence in
subsequent criminal proceedings, but North Dakota law is silent as to the
use of evidence considered in order to determine whether someone is a
sexually dangerous individual. In re G.R.H. has fueled challenges to civil
commitments of sexually dangerous individuals based upon the use of selfincriminating statements. The facts of In re G.R.H. reveal the need to
amend the commitment statutes to limit the use of self-incriminating statements disclosed during treatment to the hearing for determination of a
sexually dangerous individual and prohibit the use of those statements in
subsequent criminal proceedings.
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FACTS

In 1994, G.R.H. was convicted of felony gross sexual imposition for
having consensual sex with a female five years his junior.1 Only nineteen
at the time of the offense, G.R.H. spent three years in prison before being

1. Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 3, In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587 (No.
20040287). G.R.H. was sentenced to ten years in state prison for this conviction. In re G.R.H.
(G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 2, 711 N.W.2d 587, 589.
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paroled and put on probation in 1997.2 Within two years of his parole,
G.R.H. was convicted of a crime on three more occasions.3 The most serious of the three convictions, felony corruption of a minor, was for sexual
contact with a sixteen-year-old female.4 G.R.H. served five years in jail as
a result of the new convictions and the revocation of his parole for the 1994
conviction.5
Prior to G.R.H.’s scheduled release in 2004, the State filed a petition to
civilly commit the twenty-nine-year-old G.R.H. as a sexually dangerous
individual.6 The district court found G.R.H. to be a sexually dangerous
individual, and the court committed him to a treatment facility.7 G.R.H.
brought an appeal of the district court’s order for commitment before the
North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing there was insufficient evidence to
justify commitment as a sexually dangerous person.8 G.R.H. also argued
the commitment violated constitutional due process and double jeopardy
provisions.9 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed G.R.H.’s
commitment.10
G.R.H. first requested to be discharged from commitment in August
2005, but no hearing was held because the outcome of the appeal of his
initial commitment was still pending.11 His second request for discharge
2. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 1, In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587 (No.
20040287). G.R.H.’s parole was revoked in 1998, and he served ninety days in jail for failing to
notify his probation officer of his change of address, ceasing sex offender treatment, and failing to
register as a sex offender. Id. at 1-2.
3. Id. at 2. The convictions were misdemeanor delivery of alcohol to a minor, misdemeanor
failure to register as a sex offender, and felony corruption or solicitation of a minor. Id.
4. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3. G.R.H. was twenty-four years old
when he had sexual contact, involving oral sex, with a minor. Id.
5. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 2, at 2-3.
6. G.R.H. I, ¶ 3, 711 N.W.2d at 589. North Dakota defines “sexually dangerous individual”
as:
an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who
has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual
likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. It is a rebuttable presumption
that sexually predatory conduct creates a danger to the physical or mental health or
safety of the victim of the conduct. For these purposes, mental retardation is not a
sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-03 (2008). See § 25-03.3-03 (providing statutory basis for a petition
to commit a sexually dangerous individual). If such a petition is successful, the individual is
committed to a treatment facility. § 25-03.3-13.
7. G.R.H. I, ¶ 3, 711 N.W.2d at 589-90.
8. Id. ¶ 7, 711 N.W.2d at 590.
9. Id. ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d at 592.
10. Id. ¶ 28, 711 N.W.2d at 597.
11. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶ 2, 758 N.W.2d 719, 721. The committed
sexually dangerous individual is notified at least once a year that he is entitled to a discharge
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was denied in 2006.12 Another request was made in 2007, and the district
court scheduled a hearing on the matter in the spring of 2008.13 Prior to the
hearing, two experts evaluated G.R.H., as well as his records, and came to
opposite conclusions as to whether G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous
individual.14 During the evaluations, the State’s expert was made aware of
statements G.R.H. made during treatment.15 These statements revealed
sexual contact with multiple additional adolescent victims after G.R.H.’s
first release from prison.16 Agreeing with the State’s evaluator, the district
court determined G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous individual.17
G.R.H. appealed the district court’s order, this time arguing the State
failed to provide sufficient evidence satisfying the three-element definition
of “sexually dangerous individual” under North Dakota statute.18 Affirming the district court, a majority of the North Dakota Supreme Court held
the State met its burden of proof to show G.R.H. remained a sexually
dangerous individual and, therefore, the court denied the petition for discharge.19 Justice Kapsner concurred but wrote separately to explain G.R.H.
could have challenged the commitment arguing it was punitive in effect.20
But, because G.R.H. failed to raise this issue, the court affirmed the district
court’s order.21

hearing and may file a petition for discharge with the court that committed him. § 25-03.3-18
(2008).
12. G.R.H. II, ¶ 2, 758 N.W.2d at 721.
13. Id.
14. Id. ¶ 3, 758 N.W.2d at 721. The State’s evaluator concluded G.R.H. remained a sexually
dangerous individual, while the independent evaluator determined G.R.H. was not a sexually
dangerous person. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 758 N.W.2d at 721.
15. Id. ¶ 8, 758 N.W.2d at 722.
16. Id. “In addition to the offenses for which he had been convicted, G.R.H. has admitted to
having had sexual contact with a 13- and a 14-year-old girl when he was 19; a 17-year-old girl
when he was 24; a 13-, a 14-, a 16-, and two 17-year-old girls when he was 25; and a 16-year-old
girl when he was 27.” Id.
17. Id. ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d at 721.
18. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23. On petition for discharge, the State must provide
clear and convincing evidence that the individual:
[1] engaged in sexually predatory conduct . . . [2] has a congenital or acquired
condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction [3] that makes that individual likely to engage in
further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or
mental health or safety of others.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2008).
19. G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 11, 13-14, 758 N.W.2d at 723-24.
20. Id. ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
21. Id. ¶ 27, 758 N.W.2d at 727.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Liberty is one of the basic rights secured from erroneous deprivation by
the United States Constitution.22 Liberty has long been held to include
“freedom from physical restraint,” although this protection is not absolute.23
In fact, incarceration has become the dominant form of punishment for
criminals.24 In the interest of liberty, certain procedural safeguards are
available to criminal defendants when incarceration is at stake.25 Confinement has also been used in civil matters as a means to protect the safety of
the public from people who are unable to control their actions.26 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has struggled with deciding what
procedural safeguards should be available to those who are confined under
civil law.27 This section focuses on how the United States Supreme Court
has addressed challenges to civil commitment statutes and examines North
Dakota’s approach to the civil commitment of sexually dangerous
individuals in light of federal precedent.
A. THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DIVIDE
An explanation of the purpose of criminal law and civil law is sometimes used in order to distinguish the two.28 Criminal law is meant to
punish defendants who have committed an offense against society.29 Civil
law, on the other hand, is meant to make a person or entity whole for
damage sustained as a result of actions originated by the adverse party.30
The divide between the two types of law may be obvious in many situations, but it becomes less clear when the proceedings are more of a hybrid.31
Commitment of sexually dangerous individuals often encompasses

22. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
23. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997).
24. Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 297, 297 (1974).
25. Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679,
686 (1999). See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI, VIII (providing protections such as grand
jury indictment, prohibition of double jeopardy, right against self-incrimination, due process,
speedy trial, jury trial, right to confrontation, assistance of counsel, and prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment).
26. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
27. See generally Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986) (deciding whether the Fifth
Amendment right prohibiting the use of self-incriminating statements applies to civil
commitment); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-71 (deciding whether prohibition against double
jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to civil commitments).
28. Klein, supra note 25, at 679-80.
29. Id. at 679.
30. Id. at 679-80.
31. Id. at 680.
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confinement, a feature normally associated with criminal sanctions.32 Yet,
commitment of the sexually dangerous is considered civil because it allows
the State to take care of individuals that cannot take care of themselves.33
1.

Non-Punitive Purpose

Beginning in Allen v. Illinois,34 the United States Supreme Court
examined the hybrid nature of civil commitment statutes while remaining
cognizant of the purpose of those laws.35 In Allen, the trial court ordered
the petitioner to submit to a psychiatric evaluation, and, over the
petitioner’s objection, the psychiatrists testified to their opinions that the
petitioner was likely to commit sexual offenses in the future.36 The trial
court declared the petitioner a sexually dangerous person after finding the
petitioner’s actions indicated he was likely to commit sex offenses.37 On
appeal, the petitioner argued the Illinois law relating to civil commitment of
sexually dangerous persons was criminal in nature; thus, the State’s use of
self-incriminating statements violated the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment
rights.38 The United States Supreme Court held the Illinois law was not
criminal, so the petitioner was not entitled to protection against selfincrimination.39
While the Supreme Court determined the Illinois law was civil rather
than criminal, the Court explained a civil label was not dispositive.40
Instead, the Court determined it was necessary to evaluate the “purpose or
effect” of the law in order to determine whether the law was so punitive as
to “negate the State’s intention” that the law be civil.41 Using this standard,
the Court held the purpose of commitment was not to punish, but rather to
provide treatment for the offenders only as long as they needed it.42 The
32. Id.
33. Aman Ahluwalia, Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting
Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 489, 492 (2006).
34. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
35. Allen, 478 U.S. at 368-69. While this was the first examination of civil commitment of
the sexually dangerous, the Supreme Court previously addressed the standard of proof necessary
for civil commitment of the mentally ill. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-33 (1979)
(distinguishing traditional civil commitment proceedings from criminal proceedings and holding
the standard of proof for traditional civil commitment proceedings was “clear and convincing”).
36. Allen, 478 U.S. at 366. The petitioner’s statements to the psychiatrists were not
admissible, but the psychiatric opinions based upon the statements were admissible. Id.
37. Id. at 366-67.
38. Id. at 365-66. The Fifth Amendment provides no person “shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375.
40. Id. at 369.
41. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986)).
42. Id. at 369-70.
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Court found important the fact the Illinois statute at issue expressly stated
the law was “civil in nature.”43 The Court also reasoned the law was not
punitive in effect because it allowed release upon a showing that the
individual was no longer dangerous and because the law disavowed the
main goals of punishment: retribution and deterrence.44 Accordingly, the
Court held the condition of the offender’s confinement was not punitive;
therefore, the State’s intention was not negated.45
In Kansas v. Hendricks,46 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its purpose
approach to laws related to civil commitment of the sexually dangerous.47
In Hendricks, a Kansas law for the civil commitment of the sexually
dangerous went into effect shortly before Hendricks, an individual with a
history of molesting children, was to be released from prison.48 Hendricks
was committed after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks
was a sexually violent predator.49 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed
Hendricks’ commitment by ruling the state law violated substantive due
process because it did not require a finding of mental illness.50 The United
States Supreme Court granted the State of Kansas’ petition for certiorari
and Hendricks’ cross petition.51 Hendricks’ cross-petition argued his forced
confinement was punishment, the result of a criminal proceeding, and
therefore the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy and ex post
facto laws applied.52
Looking to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court decided the
statute was non-punitive because it was neither retributive nor a deterrent,
the two primary objectives of punishment.53 Instead, the purpose of the
statute was to separate the offenders from the general public and to provide
the offenders with treatment.54 The Court also clarified that even if the
committed individual was untreatable, a statute should not be ruled punitive
43. Id. at 368.
44. Id. at 369-70.
45. Id. at 374.
46. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
47. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
48. Id. at 350.
49. Id. at 355-56.
50. Id. at 356.
51. Id. at 350.
52. Id. at 360-61.
53. Id. at 361-62. The statute was not retributive because a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite for commitment, nor is it necessary to prove an element of intent, and it was not a
deterrent because committed individuals suffer from a mental disorder that makes them unable to
control their actions. Id. at 362-63. The Court’s finding that the statute was non-punitive
“remove[d] an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto
claims.” Id. at 369.
54. Id. at 365.
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simply for confining the individual for the safety of the public.55 Explaining the legitimate use of confinement in the context of civil law, the Court
held that Kansas’ requirement of a “mental abnormality” or “personality
disorder,” coupled with proof of future dangerousness, satisfied the need to
limit civil commitment to those unable to control their dangerous
behavior.56
2.

Serious Difficulty in Controlling Behavior

In Kansas v. Crane,57 the Supreme Court again addressed the requirements of civil commitment of the sexually dangerous, this time analyzing
substantive due process.58 In Crane, the State of Kansas sought to civilly
commit Crane, a convicted sexual offender who suffered from exhibitionism and an anti-social personality disorder.59 While exhibitionism alone
would not have been enough to classify Crane as a sexual predator, the
combination of his disorders fell within the requirements of the Kansas
statute.60 Crane petitioned the trial court for summary judgment, arguing
both that the State was statutorily required to prove he was likely to commit
more offenses and that he completely lacked control of his behavior.61
After the trial court rejected Crane’s request, a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crane was a sexual predator; Crane was thus committed.62
On appeal of Crane’s commitment as a sexually violent predator, the
Kansas Supreme Court held the trial court failed to make a finding that
Crane was completely unable to control his behavior, as required under
Hendricks.63 The Kansas Supreme Court had construed Hendricks’
language of “unable to control [his] dangerousness” far too strictly.64
Disagreeing with the state supreme court’s reading of Hendricks, the United
States Supreme Court held that a total lack of control of one’s behavior was
not necessary for civil commitment.65 Such a requirement was unrealistic
and would risk disallowing civil commitment of the most “highly dan55. Id. at 366.
56. Id. at 356-60.
57. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
58. Crane, 534 U.S. at 409.
59. Id. at 411. “The essential feature of Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early
adolescence and continues into adulthood.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 701 (rev. 4th ed. 2000).
60. Id. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 411.
64. Id. at 410-11.
65. Id. at 413.
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gerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities” because even those
people retain some control over their behavior.66 Instead, a finding of
“serious difficulty in controlling behavior” was sufficient to distinguish the
civilly committed sexual offender from the typical criminal.67
B. NORTH DAKOTA’S COMMITMENT OF THE SEXUALLY DANGEROUS
North Dakota law has, in many ways, incorporated the United States
Supreme Court’s approach to challenges of civil commitment statutes.68 In
fact, the incorporation began in the first appeal of the civil commitment of a
sexually dangerous individual brought before the North Dakota Supreme
Court.69 With subsequent challenges, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
made use of United States Supreme Court precedent to develop the legitimacy of commitment of the sexually dangerous under North Dakota law.70
This section explains how North Dakota has adopted the purpose approach
to justify the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals, and how the
state has developed the definition of a sexually dangerous individual.
1.

Adoption of the Purpose Approach

The 1999 case of In re M.D.71 (M.D. I) involved an individual who
argued his commitment was improper because it violated the double
jeopardy prohibition and because there was insufficient evidence to support
a finding for commitment.72 The North Dakota Supreme Court held the
state’s double jeopardy clause was not violated because the statute was civil
and there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings for
commitment.73 In doing so, the court adopted the United States Supreme
66. Id. at 412.
67. Id. at 413.
68. See infra Part II.B.1-2 (explaining North Dakota’s adoption of the non-punitive purpose
approach and defining sexually dangerous individuals in light of the United States Supreme
Court’s precedent).
69. In re M.D. (M.D. I), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799. Specifically, this was the first
appeal of the commitment of a sexually dangerous individual under North Dakota Century Code
chapter 25-03.3. Id. ¶ 33, 598 N.W.2d at 806-07.
70. See In re R.A.S., 2009 ND 101, ¶ 17, 766 N.W.2d 712, 716 (holding the Crane
requirement that the individual has a “serious difficulty controlling his behavior” must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence); In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 18, 711 N.W.2d 587,
594-95 (holding North Dakota’s civil commitment statute satisfies the Crane substantive due
process standard); M.D. I, ¶¶ 26-31, 598 N.W.2d at 805-06 (holding the commitment statute was
civil rather than criminal; therefore, the appellant’s argument that his commitment violated double
jeopardy was unfounded).
71. 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799.
72. M.D. I, ¶¶ 24, 33, 598 N.W.2d at 804, 806-07. M.D. also challenged his commitment by
arguing the petition for commitment should have been dismissed because of undue delay and
improper public disclosure. Id. ¶¶ 11, 19, 598 N.W.2d at 802, 804.
73. Id. ¶¶ 31, 39, 598 N.W.2d at 806, 808.
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Court’s purpose approach and established the standard of review when a
finding of civil commitment of the sexually dangerous is challenged.74
Noting the similarities between the Kansas and North Dakota statutes,
the North Dakota Supreme Court utilized the Hendricks analysis to declare
the North Dakota statute constitutional.75 Applying the Hendricks reasoning, the court first examined the legislature’s intent and held the purpose of
the statute was to create a civil law because it closely mirrored the language
of the civil commitment of the mentally ill.76 The double jeopardy clause,
therefore, did not apply unless there was clear proof that the application of
the statute was so punitive, either in “purpose or effect,” that the State’s
intent to create a civil statute was invalid.77 The North Dakota Supreme
Court determined the statute was not punitive because it gave annual notice
of the right to petition for discharge and confined offenders only as long as
they were still sexually dangerous individuals.78 The court held the statute
created a civil proceeding and, therefore, was constitutional.79
The North Dakota Supreme Court also established the standard of
review for an appeal of commitment as a sexually dangerous person.80 As a
case of first impression, the court held the standard of review was “modified clearly erroneous” and “the [district] court’s findings of fact [would be
affirmed] unless they [were] induced by an erroneous view of the law” or if
the court was “firmly convinced [the findings were] not supported by clear
and convincing evidence.”81 The court’s analysis of the district court’s
findings focused on whether the presented evidence satisfied the statutory
definition of a sexually dangerous individual.82 Recognizing that clear and
convincing evidence was present, the court held the order for M.D.’s
commitment was proper.83

74. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34, 598 N.W.2d at 806-07.
75. Id. ¶¶ 26-29, 598 N.W.2d at 805-06.
76. Id. ¶ 27, 598 N.W.2d at 805.
77. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
78. M.D. I, ¶ 29, 598 N.W.2d 799, 806. M.D.’s argument that the statute was punitive was
similar to the argument made and dismissed in Hendricks. Id. ¶ 29, 598 N.W.2d at 806.
79. Id. ¶ 31, 598 N.W.2d at 806.
80. Id. ¶ 33, 598 N.W.2d at 806-07.
81. Id. ¶ 34, 598 N.W.2d at 807.
82. Id. ¶¶ 35-39, 598 N.W.2d 799, 807-08.
83. Id. ¶ 39, 598 N.W.2d at 808. Looking at M.D.’s previous conviction of gross sexual
imposition, his diagnosis of paraphilia and personality disorder, and his history of grooming his
victims, the court found clear and convincing evidence he was a sexually dangerous individual. Id.
“The essential features of paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual
urges, or behaviors generally involving[:] 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of
oneself or one’s partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting person that occur over a period of
at least 6 months.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 566 (rev. 4th ed. 2000).
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Definition of a Sexually Dangerous Individual

Expanding on the foundation laid in M.D. I, a three-element test to
classify a person as a “sexually dangerous individual” developed from the
statutory definition under North Dakota law.84 This three-element test has
been applied to evaluate the initial commitment as well as a petition for
discharge by a previously committed individual.85 Under the first element,
the person must have “engaged in sexually predatory conduct.”86 The
second element requires the person to have “a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction.”87 Under the third element, a court must
find the disorder makes the person “likely to engage in further acts of
sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or
mental health or safety of others.”88 This section addresses each of the
three elements and discusses the necessity of finding a serious difficulty in
controlling behavior.
a.

Sexually Predatory Conduct

The definition of sexually predatory conduct encompasses a wide array
of generally offensive behavior.89 The behavior includes engaging in, and
attempting to engage in, sexual acts or sexual contact with the victim, as
well as forcing the victim to have sexual contact.90 Predatory conduct is
84. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 6, 711 N.W.2d 587, 590; N.D. CENT. CODE § 2503.3-01(8) (2008). The chapter pertaining to the civil commitment of sexually dangerous
individuals, North Dakota Century Code chapter 25-03.3, was enacted in 1997. See G.R.H. I, ¶ 17,
711 N.W.2d at 590.
85. Compare G.R.H. I, 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 6-9, 711 N.W.2d 587, 590-91 (applying the threeelement test to uphold the petitioner’s initial commitment), with In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶¶ 916, 751 N.W.2d 686, 689-91 (applying the three-element test to deny petitioner’s request for
discharge). The three-element test is utilized to determine who is a sexually dangerous individual,
but the test is part of a larger commitment process. See Lori Conroy, Letting in the Light: The
Need for Independent Review of Sex Offender Assessments in North Dakota, 85 N.D. L. REV. 171,
182-83 (2009) (explaining the commitment process from initiation to petition for discharge).
86. G.R.H. I, ¶ 6, 711 N.W.2d at 590.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. § 25-03.3-01(9)(a)-(b).
90. Id. Sexual contact is defined as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of an
individual for the purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires.” Id. § 25-03.301(7). Sexual act is defined as:
[5] sexual contact between human beings, including contact between the penis and the
vulva, the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the
vulva and the vulva; or the use of an object that comes in contact with the victim’s
anus, vulva, or penis. Sexual contact between the penis and the vulva, or between the
penis and the anus, or an object and the anus, vulva, or penis of the victim, occurs
upon penetration, however slight. Emission is not required.
Id. § 25-03.3-01(6).
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further explained as having sexual contact under various factual circumstances, such as using force or threatening the victim, acting when the
victim is impaired or incapacitated, acting when the victim is a minor under
fifteen; incest between a parent or guardian and a minor over the age of
fifteen is also considered predatory conduct.91 Reviewing an offender’s
past criminal convictions is sometimes the starting and stopping point for
inquiry into the first element of sexually predatory conduct.92 Many of
those committed as sexually dangerous individuals have a criminal history
that easily satisfies the broad definition of the statute, requiring no further
analysis.93 When the first element is disputed, the argument often relates to
the factual circumstances of the crime, such as whether the crime was a
sexual offense, whether force was used during the crime, or when the
conviction was overturned.94
91. Id. § 25-03.3-01(9)(a)-(b). The specific statutory language prohibits sexual contact or
sexual acts if:
(1) The victim is compelled to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious
bodily injury, or kidnapping directed toward the victim or any human being, or the
victim is compelled to submit by any threat that would render an individual of
reasonable firmness incapable of resisting;
(2) The victim’s power to appraise or control the victim’s conduct has been substantially impaired by the administration or employment, without the victim’s knowledge,
of intoxicants or other means for purposes of preventing resistance;
(3) The actor knows or should have known that the victim is unaware that a sexual act
is being committed upon the victim;
(4) The victim is less than fifteen years old;
(5) The actor knows or should have known that the victim has a disability that substantially impairs the victim’s understanding of the nature of the sexual act or contact;
(6) The victim is in official custody or detained in a treatment facility, health care
facility, correctional facility, or other institution and is under the supervisory authority,
disciplinary control, or care of the actor; or
(7) The victim is a minor and the actor is an adult[.]
Id. § 25-03.3-01(9)(a). Sexual contact is specifically included if: “(1) The actor knows or should
have known that the contact is offensive to the victim; or (2) The victim is a minor, fifteen years
of age or older, and the actor is the minor’s parent, guardian, or is otherwise responsible for
general supervision of the victim’s welfare.” Id. § 25-03.3-01(9)(b).
92. See In re M.D. (M.D. I), 1999 ND 160, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d 799, 807 (finding the first
element met by conviction of gross sexual imposition for engaging in sexual acts with a minor).
93. See In re Barrera, 2008 ND 25, ¶ 6, 744 N.W.2d 744, 746 (finding the first element met
by conviction of gross sexual imposition with a seven-year-old); In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶ 11,
751 N.W.2d 686, 689 (finding the first element met by conviction of gross sexual imposition for
molesting a five-year-old); In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 12, 713 N.W.2d 518, 522 (finding the first
element met by conviction of “corruption of a minor involving a sexual act committed on a minor
victim after [the offender] had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl” and a conviction of
“gross sexual imposition after admitting [the offender] had digitally penetrated a nine-year-old
girl”); M.D. I, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d at 807 (finding the first element met by conviction of gross
sexual imposition for engaging in sexual acts with a minor).
94. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 25, 730 N.W.2d 570, 576 (finding the first
element met by conviction of sexual assault on fifteen-year-old girl while the offender was
seventeen, even though the offender argued the assault did not involve force); In re P.F., 2006 ND
82, ¶¶ 20-21, 712 N.W.2d 610, 615-16 (finding the first element met by conviction of criminal
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As the North Dakota Supreme Court determined in In re P.F.,95 the
first element analysis does not always end at convictions.96 In P.F., the
petitioner argued that his two convictions for criminal trespass were not
sexual offenses and that an overturned conviction for gross sexual imposition could not be considered.97 After examining the definition of conduct
and the context of the statute, the court held sexually predatory conduct
encompassed all conduct, including conduct that did not result in a charge
or conviction.98 The court noted the evidence in all three offenses implicated P.F. in predatory conduct.99
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also determined that sexually
predatory conduct only includes acts that were specifically described in the
statutory language.100 In In re Voisine,101 the court evaluated a trial court’s
finding that sexually predatory conduct included incest between a sixty-five
year old father and his adult children.102 While the conduct was “criminal
and morally reprehensible,” it did not satisfy the definition of sexually
predatory conduct.103 Due to the trial court’s erroneous view of the law, the
supreme court reversed and remanded.104
b.

Disorder Requirement

Instead of focusing on criminal history, analysis of the second element
concentrates on whether the individual has some type of disorder.105 Prior
to a hearing for commitment, the individual is evaluated by one or more
State experts and may also retain his or her own expert to evaluate the
alleged condition.106 The evaluation is based upon all court records and all
relevant psychological and medical records or reports and may include an
assessment of the individual.107 Testimony based upon these evaluations

trespass and overturned conviction of gross sexual imposition because the underlying acts of the
crime, whether charged for or convicted of, showed sexually predatory conduct).
95. 2006 ND 82, 712 N.W.2d 610.
96. P.F., ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d at 616.
97. Id. ¶ 20, 712 N.W.2d at 615.
98. Id. ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d at 616; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-15 (2008) (noting
“evidence of prior sexually predatory conduct or criminal conduct, including a record of the
juvenile court, is admissible” in a proceeding for commitment).
99. P.F., ¶ 20, 712 N.W.2d at 616.
100. In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d 908, 912.
101. 2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908.
102. Id. ¶¶ 2, 11, 777 N.W.2d at 910, 912.
103. Id. ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d at 912.
104. Id. ¶ 15, 777 N.W.2d at 913.
105. In re M.B.K., 2002 ND 25, ¶ 11, 639 N.W.2d 473, 476.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12 (2008).
107. Id.
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aids the trial court in evaluating the second element.108 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has further noted it is the trial court’s responsibility to
evaluate the credibility of the expert testimony.109 Consequently, the
reviewing court will defer to the trial court in the event there is conflicting
testimony between experts.110
To satisfy this element, the State must produce expert evidence to show
the individual has a condition that is made evident through a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder.111 While the definition of “disorder” in the
context of a sexually dangerous individual does not specify which disorders
are included, mental retardation is specifically excluded.112 A finding of a
sexual disorder such as pedophilia satisfies the second element, as does a
combination of a sexual disorder and a personality disorder.113 However,
an individual’s disorder does not have to be a sexual disorder.114 For
instance, a finding of anti-social personality disorder satisfies the second
element, yet it does not implicate a sexual disorder.115
There is some authority to suggest anti-social personality disorder
alone should not satisfy this element.116 Under that authority, the fact that a
substantial portion of typical criminals could be diagnosed with anti-social
personality disorder makes the use of that disorder suspect in establishing
the disorder requirement.117 Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court
108. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 29, 730 N.W.2d 570, 577-78 (finding the
second element met through an evaluator’s testimony about the offender’s anti-social personality
disorder).
109. See In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 23, 745 N.W.2d 631, 637 (finding the trial court’s
reliance on the State’s psychologists, instead of independent evaluators, was not error).
110. Id.
111. M.B.K., ¶ 11, 639 N.W.2d at 476 (providing that expert evidence must be admitted
relating to the offender’s condition); see also § 25-03.3-01(8) (defining the second element as an
individual “who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a
personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction”).
112. § 25-03.3-01(8).
113. See, e.g., In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶ 11, 751 N.W.2d 686, 689 (finding the second
element met by a diagnosis of paraphilia and pedophilia); In re M.D. (M.D. I), 1999 ND 160, ¶ 38,
598 N.W.2d 799, 808 (finding the second element met by a diagnosis of paraphilia, with a fixation
on adolescent males, and anti-social personality disorder).
114. Compare M.D. I, ¶ 38, 598 N.W.2d at 808 (finding the second element met by a
diagnosis of paraphilia, with a fixation on adolescent males, and anti-social personality disorder),
with In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 13, 713 N.W.2d 518, 522 (finding the second element met by a
diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder).
115. See, e.g., J.M., ¶ 13, 713 N.W.2d at 522 (finding the second element met by a diagnosis
of anti-social personality disorder). But see In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 43, 711
N.W.2d 587, 600 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (questioning whether a diagnosis of anti-social
personality disorder satisfies the statutory definition).
116. See In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 48, 730 N.W.2d 570, 583 (Kapsner, J., dissenting)
(noting other jurisdictions have determined anti-social personality disorder is insufficient to civilly
commit a person).
117. See G.R.H. I, ¶ 40, 711 N.W.2d at 599 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (explaining “40%-60%
of the male prison population are diagnosable with antisocial personality disorder.”).
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has held that, while anti-social personality disorder does not per se meet the
second element, such a diagnosis is sufficient as long as there is a showing
of a nexus between the disorder and a serious difficulty controlling one’s
behavior.118
c.

Future Predatory Conduct

Using expert testimony, the third element requires a finding that the
individual’s disorder makes the individual “likely to engage in further acts
of sexually predatory conduct.”119 Countering an argument that the term
“likely” is vague, the North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted the
phrase to mean the “individual’s propensity towards sexual violence is of
such a degree as to pose a threat to others.”120 Cognizant of that potential
danger, the focus of the third element analysis is on the likelihood of
reoffending and the causal relationship between an individual’s disorder
and such likelihood.121
In order to gauge the likelihood of reoffending, expert evaluators often
utilize actuarial tests as a measurement for recidivism.122 These actuarial
tests are statistical models that attempt to document a correlation between
risk factors and certain outcomes.123 Evaluators rate the individual
according to specific factors depending on the type of test.124
Among the types of actuarial tests that are commonly used in civil
commitment of the sexually dangerous are the Rapid Risk Assessment for
Sexual Offender Recidivism (RRASOR), the Static-99, and the Minnesota
Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R).125 Designed to measure recidivism among sex offenders using few variables, the RRASOR
includes four factors: “(1) prior sexual offenses, (2) age at risk less than 25,

118. J.M., ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d at 522.
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2008). See also § 25-03.3-01(8) (defining the third
element as an individual who has a disorder “that makes that individual likely to engage in further
acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or
safety of others”).
120. In re M.B.K., 2002 ND 25, ¶¶ 12-18, 639 N.W.2d 473, 476-77; see also Ahluwalia,
supra note 33, at 492 (explaining the “likely” standard of Minnesota, Washington, and
Wisconsin).
121. G.R.H. I, ¶ 16, 711 N.W.2d at 594.
122. See, e.g., In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 14, 713 N.W.2d 518, 523 (finding the third element
met by a diagnosis of disorder and by actuarial test scores).
123. In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 56, 730 N.W.2d 570, 586 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
124. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment With Sex
Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1469-71
(2003).
125. Anderson, ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 586 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). See also In re Barrera,
2008 ND 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 744 N.W.2d 744, 746-47; In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d 631,
636.
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(3) extrafamilial victims, and (4) male victims.”126 The Static-99 expands
upon the RRASOR by including the same four factors, but also adding “the
number of prior sentencing dates[,] . . . any convictions for non-contact sex
offenses[,] . . . index case nonsexual violence[,] . . . prior nonsexual
violence[,] . . . any stranger victims,” and “whether the individual is
single.”127 The MnSOST-R, on the other hand, measures sixteen variables,
including the relationship between the offender and its victims, the
offender’s age, and the offender’s criminal history.128 In all of these tests, a
score is calculated and then compared to the known recidivism rate of
offenders with similar scores.129 This calculation and comparison method
has been criticized because deprivation of liberty is based not upon the
offender’s own behavior, but upon the behavior of others who are
statistically similar.130
The North Dakota Supreme Court has cautioned that judicial decisionmaking should not be replaced by actuarial scores or a contest over percentage points.131 In fact, an individual may still be found sexually dangerous
despite actuarial scores that indicated the individual was not likely to
recidivate.132 Accordingly, while actuarial scores may be used as a part of
the evaluation, testimony by those who know the individual may also help
an evaluator to determine whether the individual is likely to reoffend.133
d.

Serious Difficulty Controlling Behavior

In addition to the statutory requirements of the definition of sexually
dangerous individual, a finding that the individual has a “serious difficulty
controlling his behavior” is required to distinguish the individual from a
typical criminal.134 To satisfy this requirement, behavior while in confinement is often evaluated, including failing to progress in treatment, breaking
rules, or lacking empathy for victims.135 This requirement does not constitute a fourth element to the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous
126. Janus & Prentky, supra note 124, at 1469; see also Anderson, ¶ 58, 730 N.W.2d at 58687 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (explaining RRASOR factors).
127. Anderson, ¶ 60, 730 N.W.2d at 587 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
128. Conroy, supra note 85, at 185; Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 61, 730 N.W.2d at 587-88
(Kapsner, J., dissenting).
129. Anderson, ¶ 64, 730 N.W.2d at 588-89 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
130. Janus & Prentky, supra note 124, at 1476-77 (citing In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609,
616 (Minn. 1994) (Coyne, J., dissenting)).
131. Hehn, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d at 636.
132. Id.; In re M.D. (M.D. II), 2008 ND 208, ¶ 10, 757 N.W.2d 559, 562.
133. Hehn, ¶ 24, 745 N.W.2d at 637; M.D. II, ¶¶ 9-11, 757 N.W.2d at 561-62.
134. Hehn, ¶ 19, 745 N.W.2d at 636; accord Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
135. See M.D. II, ¶ 11, 757 N.W.2d 559, 562 (finding an inability to control behavior based
on a failure to progress in treatment); see also In re R.A.S., 2009 ND 101, ¶ 16, 766 N.W.2d 712,
716 (finding an inability to control behavior based on acts while in confinement).
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individual.136 Instead, the requirement may be viewed as a condition that
must be satisfied before an individual may be committed.137 This finding is
also subject to the clear and convincing standard used for the definition of a
sexually dangerous individual.138
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Sandstrom wrote the majority opinion for the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirming the district court’s denial of the petition for
discharge in G.R.H. II, holding the State provided clear and convincing
evidence that G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous individual.139 Justice
Kapsner wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed affirming the
district court’s order was appropriate under the circumstance, but asserted
the facts of the case implicated an issue not raised by G.R.H. on appeal.140
In her concurrence, Justice Kapsner expanded upon G.R.H.’s argument that
required disclosure was unfair and discussed the constitutional implications
of the use of self-incriminating statements in commitment proceedings.141
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
On appeal, G.R.H. argued the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence satisfying the three-element definition.142 Conceding the first
element, G.R.H. argued the State failed to meet its burden to prove the final
two elements of a sexually dangerous individual finding.143 The court
disagreed with G.R.H., holding evidence supported the district court’s
finding that G.R.H. had a condition that was manifested by a disorder or
dysfunction.144 Further, the court held evidence supported the finding that
G.R.H. was likely to engage in predatory behavior in the future.145
1.

Sexually Predatory Conduct

Because G.R.H. did not contest the district court’s finding he had
engaged in sexually predatory conduct, the court did not address the first
136. R.A.S., ¶ 15, 766 N.W.2d at 716.
137. Id.
138. Id. ¶ 17, 766 N.W.2d at 716.
139. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶¶ 1, 5, 14, 758 N.W.2d 719, 720-21, 724.
Justice Sandstrom’s majority opinion was joined by Justice Crothers, Justice Maring, and Chief
Justice VandeWalle. Id. ¶ 15, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
140. G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 26-27, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (J. Kapsner, concurring).
141. Id. ¶¶ 23-25, 758 N.W.2d at 725-27.
142. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23.
143. Id. ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d at 721.
144. Id. ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d at 723.
145. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
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element of the definition of a sexually dangerous individual.146 G.R.H.’s
criminal history, however, easily fell under the definition of sexually
predatory conduct because his gross sexual imposition conviction involved
a victim younger than fifteen years of age, and his corruption of a minor
conviction involved a sixteen-year-old.147 The court also explained all
sexually predatory conduct may be considered under the analysis of a
sexually dangerous individual; even conduct “which did not result in a
charge or conviction.”148 Arguably, the court could have considered
G.R.H.’s confession to contact with additional adolescent victims between
his two imprisonment terms if G.R.H. would have challenged the findings
under this element.149
2.

Disorder Requirement

G.R.H. argued the second element was not met because, at the discharge hearing, the State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence he
had a condition manifested by a disorder.150 At the discharge hearing, there
was conflicting testimony between experts as to the diagnosis of G.R.H.’s
disorder.151 The independent expert evaluator appointed on G.R.H.’s behalf
testified that G.R.H. did not meet the second element; the State’s expert
testified to the contrary.152 G.R.H. implicitly argued the independent
evaluator’s report and testimony were more reliable because the report and
testimony were more thorough, making the district court’s finding unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.153

146. See id. ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d at 721 (noting G.R.H. contested the second and third elements
without contesting the first element).
147. Compare In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 2, 711 N.W.2d 587, 589 (explaining
G.R.H.’s previous convictions), with N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01(9)(a)(4), (7) (2008)
(defining sexually predatory conduct as sexual contact with a victim if “[t]he victim is less than
fifteen years old” or “[t]he victim is a minor and the actor is an adult”).
148. G.R.H. II, ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722.
149. See id. ¶¶ 7-9, 12-13, 758 N.W.2d at 722-24 (noting conduct not resulting in a charge or
conviction may be considered in an analysis under North Dakota Century Code section 25-03.301(8)).
150. Id. ¶ 8, 758 N.W.2d at 722.
151. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 758 N.W.2d at 721.
152. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 2-3, In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719 (No.
20080102). The independent evaluator diagnosed G.R.H. with psychoactive substance abuse—
abusing more than one psychoactive substance—and also “found personality disorder not otherwise specified with some borderline, antisocial, narcissistic, schizophrenic-like behavior, and
paranoid features.” G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 3-4, 758 N.W.2d at 721. The State’s expert diagnosed G.R.H.
with anti-social personality disorder and paraphilia, not otherwise-specified hebephilia—the
sexual attraction to adolescents. Id.
153. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant ¶ 37, In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719
(No. 20080102) (noting Dr. Coombs’ (State’s expert) report was only nine pages long while Dr.
Riedel’s (independent expert) report was eighty-one pages in length).
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Rejecting G.R.H.’s argument, the court held the district court’s analysis
of the second element was supported by clear and convincing evidence.154
The district court sided with the State’s expert for two reasons.155 First, the
testimony of the State’s evaluator was more reliable because his opinion
was better-informed.156 The State evaluator’s testimony reflected consideration of the additional adolescent victims, something lacking in the independent evaluator’s initial testimony.157 Second, the diagnosis asserted by
the State’s evaluator was more credible because consideration of the
additional adolescent victims supported G.R.H.’s diagnosis of a sexual
attraction to adolescents, in addition to anti-social personality disorder.158
Although he initially diagnosed G.R.H. with anti-social personality disorder, the independent evaluator conceded during testimony that a diagnosis
of hebephilia was more justified if the additional victims were considered.159 Accordingly, as to the second element, the court held the district
court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.160
3.

Future Predatory Conduct

G.R.H. argued the third element was not met because the State failed to
provide clear and convincing evidence his condition made him likely to
commit more acts of sexually predatory conduct.161 The testimony of the
two experts diverged on the third element as well, with the State’s expert
opining G.R.H. was likely to reoffend and the independent expert coming to
the opposite conclusion.162 G.R.H., again, argued the independent evaluator’s testimony was more credible because that evaluator conducted
numerous risk assessments and completed an eighty-one page report; the
State’s expert did not initially conduct any tests, but instead updated
assessments done by previous evaluators.163
154. G.R.H. II, ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d at 723.
155. See id. (finding both Dr. Coombs’ testimony and diagnosis more reliable).
156. Id.
157. Id. The Court explained the district court believed Dr. Riedel was credible, just less
informed. Id. On cross examination, Dr. Riedel conceded that consideration of the additional
victims was absent from his initial report and a diagnosis of hebephilia would be more justified.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 152, ¶ 5.
158. G.R.H. II, ¶ 3, 758 N.W.2d at 721.
159. Id. ¶ 8, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23; Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 153, ¶ 36;
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 152, at 2.
160. G.R.H. II, ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d at 723. Consistent with its earlier determination that the
trial court is the best evaluator of credibility in cases of conflicting testimony, the court did not
“second-guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court.” Id. ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722
(quoting In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 23, 745 N.W.2d 631, 637).
161. G.R.H. II, ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723.
162. Id. ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723-24; Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 153, ¶ 53.
163. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 153, ¶ 51.
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The court rejected G.R.H.’s argument and agreed with the district
court’s finding that the third element was satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence.164 The court gave three justifications as to why the district
court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.165 First,
the court noted the State’s expert testified G.R.H.’s likelihood to reoffend
was bolstered by reevaluated actuarial tests that placed G.R.H. between a
twenty-one and sixty-five percent chance of reoffending.166 The independent evaluator also testified to the results of tests, but his results placed
G.R.H. at a different risk of reoffending.167 Consistent with previous
decisions, the court noted it would not be caught in “a contest over percentage points” as to whether or not an individual was likely to reoffend.168
Although the test scores alone were not conclusive, they did not need to
be.169
Second, G.R.H. demonstrated his lack of self-discipline while in treatment.170 G.R.H. engaged in rule-breaking behavior during treatment by
calling sex-line numbers and having sexual relations with visitors.171 As a
result, G.R.H.’s treatment status was downgraded due to lack of selfcontrol.172 Both his rule-breaking behavior and his admission of additional
adolescent victims indicated G.R.H. had a serious difficulty controlling his
behavior.173
Third, the combination of G.R.H.’s disorders and actions proved
G.R.H. would be more likely to engage in predatory conduct if released.174
The State’s expert testified that G.R.H’s anti-social personality disorder and
his sexual attraction to adolescents, mixed with his rule-breaking behavior
and his admission to additional adolescent victims, made him more likely to
commit another offense.175 The court explained that unlike a typical
criminal, G.R.H.’s inability to control his behavior made him more likely to
164. G.R.H. II, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 166-78.
166. G.R.H. II, ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723. G.R.H.’s score placed him at “a twenty-one percent likelihood of reoffending in ten years” on the RRASOR, “a fifty-two percent likelihood of
reconviction in fifteen years” on the Static-99, and “a six-year likelihood of rearrest rate for a
sexual offense of fifty-six percentage” on the MnSOST-R. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
168. Id. (quoting In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d 631, 636).
169. G.R.H. II, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
170. Id. ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723.
171. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 152, at 10.
172. G.R.H. II, ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723.
173. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. This finding satisfied the requirements of Hehn and Crane
that there must be a finding the individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. See
supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
174. G.R.H. II, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
175. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 758 N.W.2d at 723-24.
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reoffend if not kept in treatment.176 For these reasons, the district court’s
finding that G.R.H. was likely to engage in further acts of predatory
conduct was supported by clear and convincing evidence.177 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the district court’s finding that G.R.H. remained a
sexually dangerous individual and upheld the district court’s order denying
G.R.H.’s petition for discharge.178
B. JUSTICE KAPSNER’S CONCURRING OPINION
With the sole concurrence, Justice Kapsner wrote separately to explain
G.R.H.’s continuing confinement was based upon self-incriminating
statements.179 Justice Kapsner pointed out G.R.H. could have argued his
civil commitment was punitive, so the prohibition against self-incriminating
statements applied.180 The concurrence was an expansion of G.R.H.’s
supporting argument that it was unfair to force committed individuals, as a
part of their treatment, to disclose past misdeeds or have their refusal to
disclose past misdeeds held against them.181 However, G.R.H. failed to
specifically raise an argument that this unfairness made the statutes punitive
in effect.182 Therefore, it was appropriate to affirm the district court’s
findings.183
Justice Kapsner began by noting the similarity between civil commitment and criminal law, which both end in deprivation of liberty.184 Yet, as
Justice Kapsner explained, constitutional challenges to civil commitment
laws have been overcome by arguing the purpose of the laws was not to
punish, but to provide treatment for the offender.185 As Justice Kapsner
noted, the North Dakota civil commitment law could be defended against
constitutional challenges because it specifically provided placement of
individuals “in an appropriate facility or program at which treatment is
available.”186

176. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
177. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 14, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
179. Id. ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
180. Id. ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727.
181. Brief of Respondent-Appellant ¶ 36, In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719 (No.
20080102).
182. G.R.H. II, ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
183. Id. ¶ 27, 758 N.W.2d at 727.
184. Id. ¶ 17, 758 N.W.2d at 725.
185. Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) and Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364, 373-74 (1986)).
186. G.R.H. II, ¶ 19, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 25-03.3-13 (2008)).
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Justice Kapsner’s analysis did not stop there, however, because a law’s
civil label is not enough when a defendant can provide the “clearest proof”
the statute is “so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate” the
intention of the State.187 This approach was attempted in Allen, where the
petitioner argued an Illinois civil commitment law was punitive; thus, he
should have been entitled to the prohibition against self-incrimination.188
The argument in Allen was unsuccessful, but Justice Kapsner noted important differences between Allen and G.R.H. II.189
First, North Dakota law specifically invalidates any confidentiality
between a patient and a psychiatrist in the context of civil commitment,
which means that any information disclosed during treatment can be used
against the individual.190 North Dakota law also limits admissibility of the
outcomes of civil commitments in subsequent criminal cases.191 However,
no such limit exists for the actual facts relied upon for commitment, so selfincriminating statements may be used during the civil commitment hearing
and any subsequent criminal case.192 Unlike criminal proceedings, the term
of confinement is indefinite when an individual is committed based upon
statements made during treatment.193 This was not the situation in Allen, as
Illinois law disallowed the use of statements to psychiatrists during
treatment in any subsequent criminal proceeding.194
Second, North Dakota civil commitment jurisprudence holds that
failure to comply with treatment may be used to determine an individual’s
status as a sexually dangerous individual.195 If individuals refuse to admit
past sexual conduct as a part of their treatment, their refusal can be used
against them at a commitment hearing.196 As Justice Kapsner summarized,
187. G.R.H. II, ¶ 22, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at
369).
188. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
189. G.R.H. II, ¶ 21, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
190. Id. ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26; see also § 25-03.3-05 (explaining the abrogation of
confidentiality).
191. § 25-03.3-16.
192. G.R.H. II, ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 726 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986).
195. G.R.H. II, ¶ 24, 758 N.W.2d at 726 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
196. Id. ¶ 25, 758 N.W.2d at 727. See also Klein, supra note 25, at 713-14 (describing an
individual’s decision of whether to invoke the Fifth Amendment or answer to his or her detriment
as a “Hobson’s choice”); Merrill A. Maiano, Sex Offender Probationers and the Fifth Amendment:
Rethinking Compulsion and Exploring Preventative Measures in the Face of Required Treatment
Programs, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 999 (2006) (describing a situation where sexoffenders are forced to incriminate themselves in the face of revoked probation or face incarceration for revealing the details of uncharged offenses as a “Catch 22”); Anita Schlank and Rick
Harry, Essay: The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex Offender in Minnesota: A Review of
the Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (2003) (describing a “Hobson’s
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“[i]f disclosure is demanded as a prerequisite to treatment and either the
disclosure or the failure to comply is the basis for continuing confinement,
the ability to assert a privilege has been lost.”197 Such a dilemma and the
resulting loss of liberty, according to Justice Kapsner, might have proven
the civil commitment statutes were punitive in effect.198 The concurrence
closed by noting G.R.H. did not raise such a challenge, and by stating the
case should not be viewed as precluding a properly-raised argument with
facts similar to those in G.R.H. II.199
IV. IMPACT
The focus of the court throughout its analysis, both in the majority
opinion and the concurrence, was on the confessions G.R.H. made during
treatment.200 In terms of North Dakota case law, G.R.H. II is an expansion
of the scope of conduct that can be considered for an analysis of whether a
person is a sexually dangerous individual.201 Further, the concurrence has
fueled challenges to civil commitments in North Dakota.202
A. SCOPE OF SEXUALLY PREDATORY CONDUCT
Early in its majority opinion, the court explained all sexually predatory
conduct could be considered for the purposes of civil commitment, and the
court then proceeded to focus on the admission by G.R.H. that he engaged
in such conduct with additional victims.203 The court’s explanation
stemmed from P.F., but the court’s holding in that case resulted from its
consideration of conduct that resulted in a charge or conviction.204
G.R.H.’s conduct resulted in neither a charge nor a conviction, yet the court
stated all conduct, presumably including G.R.H.’s disclosures of additional
victims, could be considered.205 Compared to the analysis in G.R.H. II, the
P.F. holding now takes into account all conduct that did not result in a
charge or conviction, as well as the conduct contained in disclosures by

choice” for sex offenders who will have disclosed information used against them in civil commitment hearings or have their refusal to participate in treatment also used against them).
197. G.R.H. II, ¶ 25, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
198. Id. ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727.
199. Id. ¶ 27.
200. See id. ¶¶ 1-27, 758 N.W.2d at 720-27 (referring to the statements eleven times in the
majority opinion and four times in the concurrence).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 213-16.
203. G.R.H. II, ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722.
204. In re P.F., 2006 ND 82, ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d 610, 616.
205. G.R.H. II, ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722.
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committed individuals.206 Thus, if there was any doubt as to the scope of
relevant sexually predatory conduct, G.R.H. II should be viewed as an
affirmation that all sexually predatory conduct is relevant under the analysis
of a sexually dangerous individual, including disclosures made by committed individuals themselves.207
B. CHALLENGES TO THE CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS
Justice Kapsner’s concurrence, noting G.R.H. II should not be viewed
as precluding a punitive challenge, alluded to potential challenges based on
the use of self-incriminating statements.208 The success of an argument that
the civil commitment of the sexually dangerous is punitive when selfincriminating statements are used against an individual would depend upon
distinguishing Allen, just as Justice Kapsner’s concurrence sought to do in
G.R.H. II.209 An important difference for Justice Kapsner was the fact that
Illinois law barred the statements Allen made to psychiatrists from future
use in criminal prosecution, something absent from North Dakota law.210
Other jurisdictions have rejected similar claims of violations of the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, but those jurisdictions also recognize that the statements cannot be used in later criminal proceedings.211
206. Compare P.F., 2006 ND 82, ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d at 616 (holding all conduct, including
that which did not result in a charge or conviction, may be included in analysis), with G.R.H. II,
¶¶ 7-8, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23 (noting all conduct, including self-incriminating statements, can be
included in analysis).
207. See, e.g., In re Vantreece, 2009 ND 152, ¶ 17, 771 N.W.2d 585, 591 (citing G.R.H. II
for the proposition that all sexually predatory conduct may be considered); In re A.M., 2009 ND
104, ¶ 10, 766 N.W.2d 437, 440 (citing G.R.H. II for the proposition that all sexually predatory
conduct may be considered). The North Dakota Supreme Court has subsequently explained that
only conduct that meets the specific definition of “sexually predatory conduct” may be considered
for the first element of a sexually dangerous individual analysis, while “all conduct of a sexually
predatory nature” may be considered for determination of the second element and “all relevant
conduct should be considered” for the third element. See In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶¶ 12-14,
777 N.W.2d 908, 912-13 (holding incest between consenting adults does not meet the statutory
definition of “sexually predatory conduct”).
208. See G.R.H. II, ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (explaining “[t]his
case should not be understood, however, to mean the issue could not be examined, if properly
raised”).
209. G.R.H. II, ¶ 21, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (explaining “[t]he
circumstances in Allen were different from those G.R.H. has experienced”).
210. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26 (Kapsner, J., concurring). Arguably, a committed
individual would have to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to not answer the questions and
also fear he would be committed even if he did not answer the questions. See State v. Crabtree,
2008 ND 174, ¶ 23, 756 N.W.2d 189, 197 (holding: (1) statements made by a probationer, who
voluntarily took a polygraph and admitted to having sexual contact with a minor, were not
compelled because the probationer was not coerced; and (2) that he would not be punished for
asserting the privilege).
211. See, e.g., In re Sutton, 828 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the
Fifth Amendment does not allow an individual subject to commitment to avoid a deposition, but
also noting the individual may object to specific questions if the answer would incriminate the
individual); Madison v. Craven, 169 P.3d 284, 290 (Idaho 2007) (noting the Fifth Amendment
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The success of a future challenge to a North Dakota civil commitment of
the sexually dangerous would hinge upon an acceptance that continuing
confinement based upon self-incrimination or refusal to self-incriminate,
combined with a lack of protection against future criminal prosecution, is in
fact “the clearest proof” envisioned by the majority in Allen.212
213
A similar argument was raised in In re Maedche, where incriminating
statements made during a probationary pre-polygraph interview and
examination were later used as evidence in a civil commitment proceed214
ing. After being committed as a sexually dangerous individual, Maedche
appealed arguing the trial court’s consideration of the statements made
215
during the polygraph violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument when it held that
Maedche had “not offered ‘the clearest proof’ that North Dakota’s statutory
216
scheme is ‘so punitive’ that it must be considered criminal.”

Self-Incrimination Clause does not apply to statements of a prisoner admitting to sexual attraction
to his daughter because the statements could not be used in future criminal proceedings); Bankes
v. Simmones, 963 P.2d 412, 419-20 (Kan. 1998) (noting the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause does not apply to the Kansas Sexual Predator Act because the Act is civil, but also noting
that if a prisoner is given no choice but to provide incriminating information, the State must give
the prisoner immunity or be barred from using that information at subsequent criminal proceedings); Razor v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Ky. App. 1997) (holding a probationer’s
right against self-incrimination is not violated when an admission of crimes was required as part
of treatment because the statements could not be used in subsequent criminal prosecution); In re
Canupp, 671 S.E.2d 614, 617 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the Fifth Amendment does not allow
an individual subject to commitment as a sexually violent predator to refuse to take the stand
altogether, but also noting he can refuse to answer questions that would incriminate him); In re
Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 654 (Tex. 2005) (noting the Fifth Amendment does not allow an
individual subject to commitment to avoid the stand altogether, but also noting if the individual
were to blurt out incriminating statements, the court would excise the statements from the record
or grant the individual immunity). But see In re Commitment of Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶¶ 14-15, 33,
292 Wis.2d 1, ¶¶ 14-15, 33, 718 N.W.2d 90, ¶¶ 14-15, 33 (finding statements made to a parole
officer about an attempt to forcibly enter a neighbor’s residence to have sex may be a violation of
the Self-Incrimination Clause during a trial to commit the individual as sexually dangerous).
212. Compare Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (describing clearest proof), with
G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 21-23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (explaining lack of protection
against use of evidence in a “subsequent criminal proceeding” and inability to assert privilege
when “disclosure or the failure to comply is the basis for continuing confinement”).
213. 2010 ND 171, 788 N.W.2d 331.
214. Id. ¶¶ 4-6, 788 N.W.2d at 333-34. The statements “disclosed previously unknown
sexual contact with minors that had occurred when he was an adult.” Id. ¶ 4, 788 N.W.2d at 333.
215. Id. ¶ 19, 788 N.W.2d at 337.
216. Id. ¶ 23, 788 N.W.2d at 337. Justice Kapsner dissented from the majority opinion,
explaining that the record in Maedche demonstrated why the sexually dangerous individual law
was punitive in nature. Id. ¶ 30, 788 N.W.2d at 338 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
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C. CHANGES TO THE CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS
At minimum, G.R.H. II is illustrative of the opposing interests that
compete in programs to treat sex offenders.217 The confined individuals
who are a part of the treatment program have an interest to avoid incriminating themselves during treatment.218 The State has an interest both to
treat the individuals in order to protect the safety of the public and to
prosecute serious crimes.219 North Dakota law currently approaches this
situation by prohibiting the use of final determinations in civil commitments in subsequent criminal proceedings.220 However, North Dakota law
is silent as to the use of evidence considered in order to determine whether
someone is a sexually dangerous individual.221
Commentators offer a number of suggestions to resolve the tension
between the competing interests in treatment programs that require disclosure of past misdeeds. There is a consensus among these commentators
that disclosure by the offender is necessary for treatment to be successful.222
The commentators’ opinions, however, diverge on what should be done
once the disclosures are made. One commentator posits mandatory polygraph testing is an indispensible part of sex offender treatment, but
acknowledges the individual should be allowed to not answer incriminating
questions.223 Another commentator commends Wisconsin’s approach,
which makes polygraph testing optional and declines to punish an individual who refuses to participate in polygraph testing.224 Some suggest it is
necessary to grant outright immunity during polygraph testing, but another
believes granting immunity is inconsistent with the goals of treatment

217. See Maiano, supra note 196, at 1000 (describing “conflict between the government’s
interest in treating sex offenders, the government’s interest in prosecuting sex offenders, and the
offender’s right to remain silent during the course of government mandated treatment”); Angela
Kebric, Polygraph Testing in Sex Offender Treatment: A Constitutional and Essential Tool for
Effective Treatment, 41 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 429, 439-40 (2009) (describing “tension between two
competing interests: [p]reserving a sex offender’s privilege against self-incrimination and
obtaining information necessary for effective treatment.”).
218. Kebric, supra note 217, at 440.
219. Maiano, supra note 196, at 1000.
220. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d 719, 726 (Kapsner, J.,
concurring) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-16 (2008)).
221. G.R.H. II, ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 726 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
222. David Heim, Note, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t—Why Minnesota’s
Prison-Based Sex Offender Treatment Program Violates the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 32
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1217, 1249 (2006); Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex
Offenders: Pursuing Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347,
367 (1998); Kebric, supra note 217, at 440; Schlank & Harry, supra note 196, at 1223-24.
223. Kebric, supra note 217, at 443, 447.
224. Maiano, supra note 196, at 1019-20.
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because it undermines the gravity of sex offenses.225 Still others believe
denial should be embraced for a limited time so the individual can progress
in treatment and eventually overcome denial.226
A sensible change to North Dakota law, which is necessary as demonstrated in G.R.H. II, is to ameliorate the problem by balancing the interests
involved in committing the sexually dangerous.227 If treatment and its
rehabilitative result are improved through confession by the committed
individual, then confession should be encouraged in the interest of public
safety.228 The committed individuals, however, should not fear prosecution
based upon their honest disclosures.229 A rational compromise would be to
limit the use of facts disclosed during confessions to the hearing for
determination of a sexually dangerous individual and prohibit the use of
those facts in future criminal prosecutions.230 Such an approach balances
the interests involved and minimizes the possibility of punitive challenges
based upon the arguments raised in Justice Kapsner’s concurrence.231 The
proper and most effective venue for this change to North Dakota law is with
the policy-making legislative branch.232 While affording sexually dangerous individuals greater procedural protections may not be politically
popular, the legal community “must always remain cognizant that the fervor
of a rightfully outraged public to prevent [heinous] crimes cannot be
225. Compare Jamie Tanabe, Right Against Self Incrimination v. Public Safety: Does
Hawaii’s Sex Offender Treatment Program Violate the Fifth Amendment?, 23 U. HAW. L. REV.
825, 854 (2001), and Heim, supra note 222, at 1249, with Maiano, supra note 196, at 1015-16.
226. Heim, supra note 222, at 1247; Kaden, supra note 222, at 370.
227. See Maiano, supra note 196, at 1019-20 (noting Wisconsin’s approach to sex offender
treatment).
228. See Kebric, supra note 217, at 439 (arguing polygraph testing effectuates treatment,
reduces recidivism, and increases the public safety); Heim, supra note 222, at 1249 (arguing
“[i]mmunity would also encourage the offender to accept responsibility and complete the therapy
process).
229. See Maiano, supra note 196, at 999-1000 (noting competing interests in sex offender
treatment).
230. See id. at 1019-20 (noting Wisconsin’s approach to sex offender treatment). A major
criticism of this approach is that prosecutors will be inhibited from pursuing charges for what
could be heinous crimes, but this does not completely foreclose prosecution, only the use of the
statements in the subsequent prosecution. See Heim, supra note 222, at 1249 (stating “immunity
would not harm the State’s interests if it does not plan to use the statements in the future”);
Tanabe, supra note 225, at 851 (stating “a defendant is immunized from prosecution based on his
immunized statements but is not immunized from any and all prosecution”); Maiano, supra note
196, at 1016 (stating “immunity only foreclose[s] prosecution based on the compelled
testimony”).
231. Maiano, supra note 196, at 1019-20; In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶ 26, 758
N.W.2d 719, 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring). But see In re Maedche, 2010 ND 171, ¶ 21, 788
N.W.2d 331, 337 (explaining a subsequent challenge based upon arguments similar to those raised
in G.R.H. II’s concurrence).
232. See In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d 908, 912 (explaining “[t]he function
of the courts is to interpret the law, not to legislate, regardless of how much we might desire to do
so” (internal quotations omitted)).
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allowed to overcome the necessary safeguards to individual liberty the law
has established.”233
V. CONCLUSION
In G.R.H. II, the North Dakota Supreme Court held there was clear and
convincing evidence G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous individual.234
G.R.H.’s previous criminal history, his confessions during treatment, his
diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder and sexual attraction to adolescents, and his lack of self-control satisfied the definition of a sexually
dangerous individual.235 Justice Kapsner’s concurrence fueled challenges
based upon self-incriminating statements, which could be avoided by
disallowing use of such statements in subsequent criminal trials.236
Paul J. Gunderson*

233. In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 18, 713 N.W.2d 518, 523.
234. G.R.H. II, ¶ 14, 758 N.W.2d at 724.
235. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11-13, 758 N.W.2d at 722-24.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 227-33 (arguing North Dakota law should disallow
the use of self-incriminating statements in subsequent criminal proceedings).
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